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1. Introduction. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that companies who wish to become more international in 
their operations seek to hire or promote foreign-born persons to the position of CEO.  One 
example is the appointment of Egyptian-born Samir Gibara at the helm of Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co. in January 1996.  In the months leading up to the change of leadership, large 
institutional investors such as Alliance Capital and Travelers Group were aggressively buying 
Goodyear's stock. One reason for increasing their positions was "the confidence about Mr. 
Gibara's centerpiece strategy: overseas growth" (New York Times, March 3, 1996). Another 
high-profile example involved the appointment of German-born Michael H. Spindler as CEO of 
Apple Computer Inc. in 1986.  Facing stiff competition from IBM at the time, Mr. Spindler's 
inauguration goal was to boost the company's foreign sales from 22% of revenues to 35% 
(Business Week, February 10, 1986).   
The first question that naturally arises from such anecdotes is whether these strategies are 
truly successful or just the nature of press clippings that accompany these CEO changes.  In 
general, there appears to be little evidence for significant changes in firms’ operations after a 
CEO turnover.  Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) examine U.S. CEO turnovers from 1971 
through 1989 and find little evidence that CEO turnover systematically affects important firm 
performance and operations indicators, including sales, assets, accounting accruals, R&D 
expenditures and advertising expenditures.   When evidence for significant effects from CEO 
turnover is found, it concerns financial variables that are easily manipulated through accepted 
accounting practices, such as write-offs of unprofitable investments and moves to reduce 
reported income (see e.g., Strong and Meyer, 1987, and Elliott and Shaw, 1988).1 
                                                          
1 There is a much more extensive literature on how firm performance may affect the probability of CEO turnover.  
Representative papers include Parrino (1997) and Huson et al. (2001).  Another strand of the literature considers 
compensation and selection of investment projects and include Barron and Waddell (2003) and Smith and Watts 
(1993). 
 3
The main contribution of this paper is to document a surprisingly large increase in U.S. 
firms’ foreign operations after a CEO turnover from a U.S.-born and -educated CEO to a 
foreign-born and -educated CEO.  Using a sample of 211 U.S. firms that were part of the 
manufacturing section of the Standard and Poor’s 500 over the period 1992-97, we examine 
whether changes to CEOs with foreign backgrounds leads these firms to subsequently have 
higher proportions of foreign assets or foreign-affiliate sales.  Our primary measure of foreign 
CEOs is whether these individuals have been either foreign-born or -educated, though we also 
examine other observable indicators of CEO backgrounds to measure “foreignness.”  Our 
empirical results show that, holding other factors constant, the proportion of a firm’s assets and 
affiliate sales that are in foreign countries (foreign affiliate asset and sales intensities) increase 
when companies change from U.S. CEOs to foreign CEOs.  In fact, our preferred estimates show 
that foreign-affiliate assets as a proportion of the firm’s total assets rises from an average of 24% 
to over 31% for the five years after the CEO change, with the majority of this increase occurring 
2-3 years after switch.  In similar manner, foreign-affiliate sales as a proportion of a firm’s total 
sales rise from 28% to approximately 42% for the five years after the CEO change.  In contrast, 
foreign affiliate asset and sales intensities for firms experiencing CEO changes that involve only 
U.S. born and educated individuals see no such effects.  
The substantial increase in foreign operations accompanying firms’ shift to foreign CEOs 
has a number of potential explanations.  One explanation is network connections.  Recent papers 
have explored the role of personal, social, and business connections (“networks”) in overcoming 
informal barriers to trade such as inadequate information or poor contract enforceability.2  As 
evidence for this, Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998), and Rauch and Trindade (2002) 
document that immigrant stocks substantially increase trade flows between the immigrant’s 
                                                          
2 Rauch (2001) provides a literature review of the role of transnational networks in trade flows. 
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home and host countries.3  Such network effects allow individuals to exploit trading 
opportunities that non-networked individuals may not have observed or were unwilling to 
undertake.4  A similar explanation may be offered for why foreign CEOs lead to substantial 
expansion of firms’ foreign operations. 5   Personal, social, and business connections that a 
foreign CEO has to foreign markets may provide more profitable opportunities for a firm in these 
markets than would have otherwise been available.   
Alternatively, a firm may have a wide variety of potential expansion strategies at any 
given moment, but a foreign CEO may simply have a preference for expansion into foreign 
markets.  For example, in a candid remark about heritage as a strategy, Gordon Kreh, CEO of 
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co. says: "Your experience gives you insight.... 
Coming from abroad, I have more of a global perspective" (The Hartford Courant, March 10, 
1997).  Another alternative is that firms that plan to undertake significant expansions into foreign 
markets appoint foreign CEOs as a signal to the market of the profitability of such expansion 
strategies. 
While finding evidence to distinguish between these alternative explanations is difficult, 
we undertake a few alternative analyses to explore the issue further.  First, we examine whether 
the increase in foreign market participation for the firms that switch to a foreign CEO are 
disproportionately in regions from where the CEO was born and/or educated.  We find no 
                                                          
3 Rauch and Trindade (2002) further show that such effects of immigrant stocks on trade are larger for trade in 
differentiated products, where the value of information is arguably more important, than homogeneous commodities.  
4 This issue has become of interest recently in the international trade literature, where substantial evidence has been 
found that international trade flows are vastly lower than those predicted by theory (see, e.g., McCallum, 1995). 
5 A related literature has found evidence that Japanese business groups (or networks) may promote greater FDI 
activity.  These include Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996), Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995), and Blonigen, Ellis 
and Fausten (2000). The evidence primarily shows network effects for business groups that have vertical linkages, 
making it difficult to identify whether such FDI-promoting effects are due to informational advantages of 
networking or agglomeration externalities.  Tong (2001) provides evidence that FDI is greater between countries 
with common Chinese immigrant stocks, suggesting such network connections amongst ethnic groups can increase 
FDI activity.  Greaney (forthcoming) presents a theoretical model of networks and FDI activity. 
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evidence for this which argues against a networks explanation.  On the other hand, we find that 
foreign market participation by firms does not decline after a reverse switch from a foreign CEO 
to a U.S. CEO.  This may be more consistent with a networks explanation, which remain after 
established, than with an alternative explanation that suggests firms’ investment strategies are 
simply influenced by the CEO’s preferences (global or domestic).  Finally, we examine whether 
U.S. CEOs with substantial experience heading international operations for major firms elicit 
similar foreign market expansion effects when succeeding U.S. CEOs with no such experience.  
In other words, do we find similar effects on foreign market participation as those we see when a 
company switches to a foreign-born or -educated CEO?  We find no such evidence, suggesting 
that foreign experiences do not lead to equally strong networks and/or a global perspective as 
does heritage and education.    
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  The next section describes our empirical 
framework.  Section three describes the data sample construction and briefly provides descriptive 
statistics.  Section four discusses the empirical results and section five concludes. 
 
2. Empirical Methodology. 
In previous literature, the determinants of FDI have been traditionally examined within 
the ownership-location-internalization (OLI) framework developed by Dunning (1977).  Most 
empirical studies of firms’ FDI activities have found that firms that are larger and have greater 
firm-specific intangible assets (typically proxied by R&D and advertising intensity) are also 
more likely to have multinational production and sales activities.6  If foreign CEOs have unique 
network connections to foreign regions, such connections can be viewed as another type of 
                                                          
6 For example, see Morck and Yeung (1992), Pugel et al. (1996), Kogut and Chang (1996), and Belderbos (1997). 
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intangible asset that reduces search costs (and perhaps other costs) and therefore encourages the 
company to increase its foreign market position, everything else equal.   
Given available data (described more below) we focus on two measures of foreign 
market position by a firm: foreign asset intensity and foreign sales intensity.  Foreign asset 
intensity is defined as a firm’s foreign assets as a proportion of its total assets, while foreign sales 
intensity is foreign affiliate sales to total firm sales.  We use these intensity measures, rather than 
levels of foreign assets and sales, since a firm’s size can greatly influence the level of these 
foreign-market activities.  Our testing equation is then the following: 
                   F_INTit   =  α +  β1RDINTit + β2 ADINTit  +∑ = −+−λn 0j jt,i1jt,i USFOR  
                                              + ∑ = −+−θn 0j jt,i1jt,i CEOSWITCH   + εit,                                 (1) 
where i indexes firms, t indexes years, n denotes the number of period lags, and εit is an assumed 
zero-mean error term.  F_INT represents our foreign intensity variables: foreign-asset intensity, 
which we label as FAINT in our tables below, and foreign-sales intensity, which we label 
FSINT.   As control variables we include R&D intensity (RDINTit) and advertising intensity 
(ADINTit), which are proxy variables for firm-specific intangible assets that other studies have 
found to increase FDI activity.7   
The next set of variables is comprised of indicator variables for various changes in firms’ 
CEOs, allowing for the possibility of lagged responses.  USFOR is our main focus variable 
which takes the value of “1” when the firm has changed from a U.S. CEO to a foreign CEO.  Our 
hypothesis is that the estimated coefficients (λs) on this variable are positive due to anecdotal 
evidence that new CEOs with foreign backgrounds direct the firms they lead to become more 
                                                          
7 RDINT is constructed as R&D expenditures divided by total assets and ADINT is advertising expenditures divided 
by the firm’s total sales. 
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international in their operations.  As a control we also include indicator variables for any CEO 
changes that occur, which we label CEOSWITCH.  It’s not clear what expected signs should be 
for the coefficients on the CEOSWITCH variables, particularly given mixed evidence for any 
changes following CEO turnovers in previous academic literature.  Given this setup, the 
coefficients on the USFOR variables will give us the extra effect of a CEO switch from U.S. to 
foreign on our dependent variable beyond any changes that occur for all CEO switches. 
We note that a contemporaneous correlation between a new foreign CEO and foreign-
asset and -sales intensities may be difficult to interpret due to endogeneity concerns.  Is the new 
CEO leading to greater foreign market participation or is the firm’s growth in these areas leading 
the firm to have a foreign CEO?8  As our results reveal below, the significant correlations take 
place in a lagged fashion, not contemporaneously, largely alleviating this concern over 
causation.9 
Another issue is that data on firms’ exports sales are unavailable for many firms and, 
thus, are not separately analyzed.  This certainly may affect our estimates with respect to our 
“foreign sales” intensity variable which is defined as the percent of foreign affiliate sales to the 
firm’s total sales, the latter of which includes export sales.  If a foreign CEO leads a firm to 
increase its export sales more than its foreign affiliate sales, our foreign sales measure may go 
down, not up.  Because of this issue, we will be clearly testing for whether a foreign CEO leads 
to greater foreign presence through increased foreign affiliate activity, not export sales activity. 
                                                          
8 A few of our firms have a foreign CEO throughout our sample of years.  We do not exploit this variation in our 
data, given our concern about endogeneity. 
9 The market signal hypothesis mentioned in the introduction may imply that a lagged effect would not resolve an 
endogeneity bias.  Suppose a firm’s managers decide to simultaneously expand into foreign markets and hire a 
foreign CEO, but the expansion naturally takes a longer time to come to fruition.  In this case, the foreign CEO is 
not the reason the firm became more foreign-oriented.   But this naturally begs the question of why such a firm 
deciding to expand into foreign markets would also want to hire a foreign CEO as part of this same strategy, if the 
foreign CEO did not somehow aid such a strategy.  The length of the lagged effect also seems long enough to rule 
out such a story. 
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On a final note, we also include yearly dummies in our regressions to control for 
macroeconomic factors, such as exchange rate movements, and will also examine the inclusion 
of firm-fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity.10   
 
3. Data. 
To estimate equation (1) we construct a sample of the 211 firms that were listed in the 
manufacturing section of the S&P 500 during the 1992-1997 period.  We focus on manufacturing 
firms since the bulk of U.S. FDI is by manufacturing firms, with a myriad of foreign regulatory 
restrictions facing firms in such sectors as services and telecommunications.  Construction of the 
sample began with 269 manufacturing firms that were in the S&P 500 throughout our sample 
years.  Out of this group, 211 companies had complete data for our variables of interest for the 6 
years that span the period 1992 through 1997.  The choice of timeframe is restricted by the 
availability of useable data in the S&P's Compustat database from which most of the data were 
collected.  Specifically, information on CEO characteristics in the ExecuComp file of Compustat 
begins in 1992.  Data for years beyond 1997 were excluded due to regulatory changes in 
accounting practices that make comparisons of figures in 1997 with subsequent years less 
reliable.11   
The Industrial Annual Segment of the S&P's Compustat database was the source for 
annual data on firms' assets, sales, R&D expenditures, and advertising expenditures.  Data on 
                                                          
10 Firms in our sample have varying fiscal years and all variables that vary over time, except the time dummies, are 
measured over the associated firm’s fiscal years.  This means though that there is not a one-to-one correspondence 
with our time dummies and the other time-varying covariates unless the firm’s fiscal year corresponds perfectly with 
the calendar year.  This occurs in about half our sample of firms.  Despite this issue, tests for joint significance of the 
year dummies support their inclusion in our regressions below. 
11 On June 30, 1997, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued the pronouncement for the Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131, Disclosure about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information 
(SAFS 131). The statement establishes the standards for the way companies will report information related to 
operating segments in their annual and interim financial reports. SFAS 131 has elected to make the new reporting 
more relevant than consistent or reliable. 
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firms’ foreign assets and foreign sales were obtained using the Geographic Segment file of the 
same database.   
As noted in the discussion above, there are two sets of dummy variables capturing 
information about CEO switches within firms.  USFOR is an indicator that the previous CEO 
was U.S. and the incoming CEO is “foreign.”   CEO switches can be discerned through 
information recorded in the ExecuComp file of the Compustat database, which records the names 
and positions of firms’ officers on annual basis, as well as other information on executives and 
their compensation at publicly traded firms.  To classify switches as ones that led to a foreign 
CEO we gathered data on whether the company's previous and new CEOs were foreign-born or 
foreign-educated through searches of newspaper articles announcing CEO changes from the 
Academic Universe (Lexus-Nexus) searchable database and biographical information contained 
in the S&P's Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives.12  Information on CEO heritage 
revealed that with a few exceptions, foreign-born executives are also foreign educated, and there 
are no instances of U.S.-born executives that earned their degrees abroad.  Thus, we classify a 
CEO as “foreign-connected” if either one of the two criteria is satisfied.   
Within our sample, 19 firms have a switch at some point from a U.S. to a foreign CEO 
out of 138 (or 13% of) total CEO switches.  Table 1 lists information for the 19 cases of foreign 
CEO switches in our sample.  Some of these relevant switches occurred in years before our 
sample starts in 1992 since we examine and find evidence of foreign CEO switch effects up to 5 
years after a CEO switch occurs.  While U.S.-to-foreign switches represent a relatively small 
share of switches, our results are not driven by any outlier, as our results are robust to excluding 
observations for any one of the firms that experienced a U.S.-to-foreign switch. 
                                                          
12 Newspaper announcements of CEO changes at large firms are surprisingly consistent at giving fairly detailed 
biographical information about the incoming and outgoing CEOs. 
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In general, U.S. firms with foreign CEOs have greater foreign affiliate sales and foreign 
assets.   As shown in Table 2, foreign-CEO companies also have higher foreign sales and foreign 
asset intensities.  Once again, the minimum and maximum intensity measures suggest significant 
variation.  Foreign sales intensity averages 37% for firms with foreign CEOs versus 27% for 
firms with U.S. CEOs.  Comparable numbers for foreign asset intensity are 32% and 23%, 
respectively.  Such results may obtain because foreign-oriented firms naturally promote and hire 
foreign managers and CEOs, not that foreign CEOs lead to greater foreign orientation.  Our 
empirical analysis below will explore more explicitly the direction of the causality. 
 
4. Empirical Results. 
4.1. Preliminary Estimates: OLS 
Equation (1) was estimated for both of our foreign market intensity variables for the 1266 
observations in our sample (211 companies over six years) and the results are presented in Table 
3.  For our CEO switching variables we begin by including both one- and two-period lags.  
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses below our coefficient estimates. 
Both regressions have statistically significant F-statistics for overall joint significance of 
the regressors, with most of the regressors statistically significant and of expected sign.  F-tests 
suggest that year effects are not jointly significant, though they are significant when we include 
firm fixed-effects, discussed below.  The coefficients on R&D and advertising intensity are 
positive, as expected, and statistically significant.  This is consistent with the FDI internalization 
hypothesis that firms with greater intangible assets are more likely to internalize transactions by 
establishing plants in foreign markets. 
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We next turn to our variables of interest, the CEO switching variables.  In the foreign-
asset intensity regression, two of the three coefficients on the CEO switch variables are 
statistically negative.  In fact, the cumulative effect of the CEO switch variables is a 10.5 
percentage point drop in a firm’s foreign-asset intensity over the first three years of the new 
CEOs tenure.  This translates into a very substantial decrease, given our sample foreign-asset 
intensity average of 24%, and is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.  This 
suggests that CEO switches generally lead to a firm reducing its foreign-asset intensity.  One 
explanation is that CEO switches occur when firms are not performing well, and such changes 
cause firms to focus more on domestic operations.  The decline in foreign-sales intensity is also 
large (7.4 percentage point cumulative decline) relative to the sample average foreign-sales 
intensity of 28%.   
In contrast, all three coefficients on our USFOR variables are positive in both regression 
equations, with both the contemporaneous and two-year lagged variables statistically significant.  
Our estimates imply that a company experiencing a switch from a U.S. CEO to a foreign 
connected one leads the firm to increase their foreign-asset intensity approximately 22.5 
percentage points higher than firms with other CEO switches. Likewise, the coefficients suggest 
foreign-sales intensity increases 20.4 percentage points over the first three years of a U.S.-to-
foreign CEO switch compared to other CEO switches.  Combined, the coefficients suggest that a 
firm switching from a U.S. to a foreign-connected CEO increases its foreign-asset intensity by 12 
percentage points and its foreign-sales intensity by 13 percentage points compared to a firm that 
has no CEO switch.13  If we exclude the contemporaneous switching variables due to 
endogeneity concerns, the increase in foreign-asset and foreign-sales intensities for a switch to a 
                                                          
13 Given our setup, this marginal effect is calculated as USFOR + USFORt-1 + USFORt-2 + CEOSWITCH + 
CEOSWITCHt-1 + CEOSWITCHt-2.  These marginal effects are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level 
for both regressions. 
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foreign-connected CEO yields 7-8 percentage point increases over firms with no such switch.  In 
related fashion, we tried a specification that included a one-year lead for USFOR variable to 
examine whether foreign market participation was increasing before the CEO turnover.  The 
coefficient on this one-year lead term is approximately -0.50 and statistically insignificant for 
both the foreign-asset and foreign-sales intensity equations.  Thus, the change in foreign market 
participation clearly lags the CEO turnover. 
 
4.2. Firm Fixed-Effects Estimates 
While our F-statistic for both regressions in Table 3 is statistically significant, the R2s are 
relatively low.  One possibility is that foreign market participation by firms may be due to a 
variety of unobserved firm characteristics that are not captured by our advertising and R&D 
intensity variables.  Assuming these unobserved firm-specific features are invariant over our 
sample time period, we control for such factors with firm-level fixed effects and present these 
estimates in Table 4.   
R2s for both equations go up substantially and F-tests strongly support the inclusion of 
firm-level fixed effects.  The estimates of the other regressors in both equations change 
substantially. The coefficients on our CEOSWITCH variables are no longer statistically 
negative, suggesting no general effect of a CEO switch on foreign market participation by a firm.  
This is more in line with evidence found by Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) regarding changes 
in other firm activities following a CEO turnover.  The coefficients on the U.S.-to-foreign CEO 
switch variables are still positive, as expected, though only the second annual lag coefficient is 
statistically significant.   The marginal effect of a U.S.-to-foreign switch is much reduced, 
suggesting approximately a three percentage point (or roughly 10-15%) increase in both the 
foreign asset- and sales-intensity of the firm relative to other firms in the sample.  R&D intensity 
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continues to have the correct sign with firm fixed-effects included, but is no longer statistically 
significant.  Advertising intensity reverses sign and is statistically significant.  The poor 
performance of these control variables is clearly due to the inclusion of firm fixed effects, since 
inclusion of such effects means that the other coefficient estimates are identified solely from the 
time series dimension of the data.  Annual changes in R&D intensity and advertising intensity 
may not be very informative for understanding changes in foreign market participation, whereas 
levels of these variables, which proxy for a firm’s stock of intangible assets, are obviously 
correlated with a firm’s long-run foreign market participation. 
While we expected a lag effect in our CEO switch variables due to the time for a new 
CEO to change the direction of the relatively large firms in our sample, the results in Table 4 
suggest that we may not have included enough lags and may be missing the full effect of such 
switches.  In Table 5 we include five years of lags for our CEO switch variables and present 
estimates from a firm fixed-effects specification.  The inclusion of further lags is important, as 
the positive effects from a U.S.-to-foreign CEO switch primarily occur in the second through 
fourth year after the CEO switch for both the foreign asset- and sales-intensity variables.  The 
combined effect on foreign-asset intensity for the six years following a U.S.-to-foreign CEO 
switch is 18.3 percentage points (or 75% of the mean) increase and statistically significant at the 
95% confidence level.  Similarly, the combined effect on foreign-sales intensity for the five years 
following a U.S.-to-foreign CEO switch is 21.1 percentage points (or 74% of the mean) increase.   
The coefficients on the general CEOSWITCH variables are small and statistically insignificant, 
indicating that these marginal effects of the U.S.-to-foreign switch are relative to all other firms 
in the sample, regardless of whether they had a CEO switch or not.   
Another concern with our specification and sample used in Table 5 is that it includes a 
handful of firms that changed CEOs due to a merger of two large firms, including the merger of 
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Pharmacia and Upjohn, which is recorded as a U.S.-to-foreign switch in our data.  Mergers can 
obviously lead to large discrete changes in the firm’s balance sheet and may provide spurious 
results in our regressions.  Table 6 presents estimates using the same specification as Table 5, but 
dropping the seven firms in our sample that experienced CEO switches due to mergers.  While 
the coefficients on the USFOR variables continue to be positive and show a similar pattern, 
dropping the merged firms does lead to smaller marginal effects.  Our coefficients indicate that 
the foreign-asset and -sales intensities for the six years after a firm has a U.S.-to-foreign CEO 
switch are now 6.1 and 11.5 percentage points, respectively.14  These effects are still substantial 
relative to the sample averages, which are not significantly changed by the dropping of the seven 
merged firms.  Another feature of the USFOR coefficients is that the majority of the increase in 
foreign-sales intensity from a U.S.-to-foreign switch lags (by a year or two) the primary increase 
in foreign-asset intensity.  This accords with the intuition that new sales in a region may lag the 
establishment of new production assets in a foreign region.  While the switch variables are 
sensitive to dropping merged firms, our results are not driven by any of the remaining firms that 
experienced a U.S.-foreign switch in our sample.  We can exclude any of these firms individually 
and generate qualitatively identical results.15 
Table 6 results represent our preferred estimates.  We also tried including a lagged 
dependent variable to control for remaining persistence in foreign market participation not 
identified by the firm fixed-effects.  While the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables are 
statistically significant (around 0.4 for both regressions) the coefficients on the other control 
variables are hardly changed.   
                                                          
14 The p-values for these foreign-asset and foreign-sales intensity effects are 0.15 and 0.02.  Combining effects for 
years one through four after the turnover (where the effects are clearly the most significant), yields a 6.0 percentage 
increase in foreign asset intensity with a p-value of 0.01, and a 9.8 percentage point increase in foreign-sales 
intensity with a p-value of 0.00.  
15 We get somewhat stronger results for our U.S.-foreign CEO effects when we exclude the companies that switched 
from a U.S. CEO to a Canadian CEO from our sample. 
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4.3. Network Effects as an Explanation 
 As discussed in the introduction, there are alternative explanations for the significant 
increases in foreign market participation we find after a firm switches from a U.S. to a foreign 
CEO.  One possibility is networks effects, whereby the foreign CEOs personal and business 
connections provide new opportunities for expansion into foreign markets.  In this section, we 
explore the evidence for network effects as much as the data allow. 
 One possibility for uncovering whether network effects are a factor is to examine whether 
the foreign market growth occurs disproportionately more in the region where the foreign CEO 
was born and/or educated – what we term as his/her heritage region.  Unfortunately, accounting 
practices do not specify a standardized method of categorizing foreign regions across countries, 
with firms creating region categories as they wish.  In addition, firms often report all foreign 
transactions as only one category.  Nevertheless, we examined the data with respect to the 19 
firms that experienced a U.S.-foreign CEO turnover to see if the growth in foreign market 
participation in the reported region category that includes the heritage region is greater than the 
other foreign regions reported by the firm. 
 Table 7 shows the 11 firms for which we have relevant data and reports the 3-year growth 
rate in assets and sales for the “heritage” region versus other foreign regions.  The other 8 firms 
were excluded primarily because they did not have their foreign operations broken into more 
than one category.  Also, one can see that for some of the firms, the reported region that comes 
closest to matching the CEO’s heritage is not that close.  For example, the new foreign CEO’s 
for Kellogg Co. and 3M Co. are Canadian, but these companies report their Canadian operations 
in an “Other, Foreign” category.  With these limitations in mind, the evidence in table 7 shows 
no support for a networks explanation.  Sales growth is slower (or declines faster) for the 
heritage region in 9 of the 11 firms, while asset growth is slower for the heritage region in 6 of 
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the 11 firms.  Assuming a foreign CEO would have the strongest connections in the regions 
where he was born and/or educated, we would expect the growth in these variables to be 
strongest in the heritage regions. 
 In Table 8, we try another experiment that potentially yields information on whether 
network effects may be behind our results.  We have a number of instances where a firm 
experiences the reverse switch -- a CEO switch from a foreign CEO to a U.S. CEO.   One 
hypothesis is that we should expect negative effects on foreign-market participation from such a 
switch.  This expectation may be most applicable if we believe the U.S.-to-foreign CEO switch 
effects are simply driven by foreign CEOs preferences to expand into foreign markets, not 
network connections.  A new U.S. CEO would presumably not have such a global preference and 
reverse the firms’ investment trends.  On the other hand, if the U.S.-to-foreign results are due to 
additional foreign networking that the foreign-connected CEO has established for the firm, it is 
not clear that these connections will necessarily dissipate.  If establishing a foreign connection is 
primarily a fixed sunk cost, then there may be a beachhead effect such that a change back to a 
U.S. CEO does not significantly impact a firm’s foreign market participation.  Table 8 presents 
results when we run the same sample and specification as in Table 6, but now include 
contemporaneous and lagged dummy variables to capture effects from a foreign-to-U.S. CEO 
switch.  The first four years of a foreign-to-U.S. CEO switch indicate negative effects on both 
foreign-asset and -sales intensities.  However, the combined effects are not as large as the 
coefficients on the U.S.-to-foreign CEO switch variables and also not statistically significant.  
Thus, the evidence for a reversal effect is weak, perhaps due to beachhead effects that come from 
establishing network connections. 
 To this point we have used foreign birth or education as the sole indication of foreign 
connections for an individual. But there may be other ways in which U.S.-born and -educated 
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individuals may establish important network connections.  To explore this we examined 
biographical information on U.S. CEO’s previous experiences to see if they had either run an 
“international” section of a firm’s operations and/or lived abroad for a significant amount of 
time.  Using this definition of “foreign” connections we created alternative variables for U.S.-to-
foreign CEO switches (ALT USFOR) and include these in our specification in Table 9 with five 
year lags to be consistent with the other CEO switch variables. Interestingly, there is no 
consistent effect seen in these U.S.-to-foreign switches using the alternative, more-inclusive 
definition of a foreign-connected CEO.  Other variables, including our standard U.S.-to-foreign 
CEO switch variables are essentially unchanged.  This evidence would argue against network 
effects to the extent one believes that U.S. CEOs heading international operations of foreign 
firms (or living abroad) gain valuable connection in foreign markets. 
 
5. Conclusion. 
This paper documents a striking increase in U.S. firms’ FDI activity after a switch to a 
CEO that is foreign-born and/or foreign-educated.  Our preferred estimates show that a U.S. 
firm’s switch from a U.S.- to foreign-connected CEO leads to 30% and 50% increases in that 
firm’s proportion of its foreign affiliates’ assets and sales, respectively, over the 5 years 
following the switch.  This is in contrast to other CEO switches in our sample that show no 
evidence of changes in these proportions after the switch.  The effect also comes through as a 
response that lags the turnover by a number of years, suggesting that the foreign CEO is leading 
to the foreign market participation change, not the other way around.  This significant increase in 
foreign market activity from a foreign CEO turnover is consistent with anecdotal evidence 
(mainly press releases), but is surprising in light of previous studies that find little evidence of 
changes in other measures of firm performance after CEO turnover. 
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The economic forces behind such effects are more difficult to identify.  One possibility is 
network effects – personal and business connections of foreign CEOs allow them to exploit 
opportunities in foreign markets that would be unavailable to the firm without such connections.  
However, our evidence shows that foreign-market participation by firms experiencing U.S.-to-
foreign CEO turnovers is not disproportionately in the regions where one would expect the 
foreign CEO’s connections to be strongest.  In addition, when we examine CEO switches to 
individuals that have previous experience running the international operations of a firm, 
experience that would presumably lead to development of international network connections, we 
find no effect of such CEO switches on the firm’s FDI activities.    
Ruling out network effects leaves us with alternative explanations that have less 
traditional economic explanations.  One alternative explanation is that a firm may have a wide 
variety of potential expansion strategies at any given moment, but a foreign CEO may have a 
global perspective that gives him/her a preference for expansion into foreign markets.  A second 
alternative is that there is a market signaling advantage to naming a foreign CEO when a firm 
decides to make a significant expansion into a foreign market.  The lagged response of the 
foreign market expansion would be consistent with this story if there are significant adjustment 
costs to implementing the firm’s expansion abroad plans.  The lengthy lags in our estimates may 
make this alternative explanation less likely, however.  We leave these issues for future research 
efforts.   
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TABLE 1. CEO Switches from U.S. to Foreign in Sample. 
 
 
 
 
Company 
 
 
 
Foreign CEO 
 
 
Switch 
Year 
 
Country of 
Foreign CEO 
Birth 
Country of 
Foreign CEO 
Undergraduate 
Degree 
 
3Com Corp. Eric Benhamou 
 
1990 
 
Algeria 
 
France 
Alberto-Culver Co. Howard Bernick 1994 Canada Canada 
American Greetings Morry Weiss 1987 Czechoslovakia U.S. 
Apple Computer Michael Spindler 1993 Germany Germany 
Becton Dickinson & Co. Clateo Castellini 1994 Italy Italy 
Campbell Soup Co. David Willis Johnson 1990 Australia Australia 
Compaq Computer Corp. Eckhard Pfeiffer 1991 Germany Germany 
Ford Motor Co. Alexander Trotman  1993 U.K. U.S. 
General Dynamics Corp. William Anders 1991 Hong Kong U.S. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Samir Gibara 1996 Egypt Egypt 
Intel Corp. Andrew Grove 1987 Hungary U.S. 
Kellogg Co. Arnold Langbo 1992 Canada Canada 
Mead Corp. Steven Mason 1992 Canada U.S. 
3M Co. Livio DeSimone 1991 Canada Canada 
National Service Ind.  Sidney Kirschner 1987 Canada U.S. 
Pharmacia & Upjohn Ley Smith 1993 Canada Canada 
Philip Morris Cos. Inc. Geoffrey Bible 1994 Australia Australia 
Rubbermaid Inc. Wolfgang Schmitt 1992 Germany U.S. 
Warner Lambert Co. Melvin Goodes 1991 Canada Canada 
 
 
 
TABLE 2. Foreign-Asset and Foreign-Sales Intensities for Sample Companies over the 
Period, 1992-97.  
 
  
Average Foreign-Sales Intensity  
(Percent of Total Sales) 
Average Foreign-Asset Intensity  
(Percent of Total Assets) 
  
Companies 
with U.S.-
born CEOs 
(N = 183) 
Companies 
with Foreign-
born CEOs 
(N = 28) 
All 
Companies 
(N = 211) 
Companies 
with U.S.-
born CEOs 
(N = 183) 
Companies 
with foreign-
born CEOs 
(N = 28) 
All 
Companies 
(N = 211) 
Mean  27 37  28 23 32 24 
Median  26 42  27 23 36 25 
Maximum 104 67 104 65 56 65 
Minimum   0  5   0   0   0   0 
Notes: Foreign sales exceed total sales in one instance where the company (Fortune Brands Inc.) was 
engaged in the production of commodities (such as tobacco, liquor, oil, etc.) that are subject to excises 
taxes. Such taxes are included in the computation of foreign sales but netted out of total company sales. 
 
